al is3 the ith unit vector in IRn-1 and ui ==-0; for i = n, an = 0 and Un(Xl' x2'..., Xn-I) = min{xl' X2,"" Xn-J I. J Subscripts will be used for coordinates, and superscripts for players.
PROPOSITION1. Let (N,
But this clearly implies pi E 8uk(ak) for all k 1=i; indeed, Remark. In Shapley and Shubik [5] , it is shown that the competitive vectors of the direct market-with n goods--enjoy the same property.
Proof. Consider the restriction of v to N' = {I, 2,..., n -I}. It is a totally balanced game of n -1 players; let (N', IR n-I, A " U') be the corresponding direct market. Define an =0 and un: IR~-l~IR by 
We show now that (J = v. For S eN', it is clear that 6(S) = v(S).
When n E S, we have
where S' = S\{n}. Now Ui(O) = 0 and (Lies ai, 1) = es; therefore, choosing
Ys= I and YT= 0 for T -1= S in the definition of Un(Lies at), we obtain v(S)~v (S).
Conversely, let (xi)ies be an S-allocation (Le., Lies Xi = LieS at). Then, for each i E S', we obtain Y~~0 for all TeN' such that (1, 1,. .., 1) E IRn-l. We will show that (n, x) is a competitive equilibrium, and that the corresponding payoff vector is precisely fl. 4 The reason the above construction need not work if we do not use the direct market for N', is that the vectors LIeS a' for S c N' may be linearly dependent and the function u" cannot be defined. . (16)]) . Therefore. Remark. The idea behind the above representation of v is that the nth player does not "bring" to the market any goods-he contributes, instead, his "good" utility function (or, production function--depending on the interpretation). This is possible because the utilities are transferable. We prove first a preliminary result which is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Let (/,~) be a measure space, assumed to be isomorphic to the unit interval [0, 1] with its Borel a-field. Let 11.,112"'" Iln be n mutually singular non-atomic probability measures on (/,~), and define
Then v is a market game. For example, it can be generated using n commodities as follows: If v is generated by a market, then, by considering the restriction to the support of jllni}7= I' it must have at least n -1 goods (Proposition 3). This is true for all n, so no finite number of commodities suffice.
The importance of this last result lies in showing that, in order to study (differentiable) market games, one need not consider the whole space H +; the finite dimensional "character" of the markets may be a useful property. A similar situation occurs in the non-differentiable case-cr. Hart [2, Open Problem A] . See also the forthcoming paper of Dubey and Neyman.
